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One Step Forward, Two Steps Back
Philip Manning

Cleveland State University

A Chinese proverb reminds us that a journey of a thousand miles begins with a first
step. I find this less encouraging than I suspect it is meant to be, since once that step
is made the journey will still be pretty long. With a little lateral thinking, we can
think of this metaphor as an apt description of natural science. Forward progress is
made and researchers rarely look back. As I write, I am looking at a syllabus for a
graduate course in molecular biology being taught right now, and the oldest refer
ence in it is to a paper from 2003. Sociologists face a different situation: we have to re
member-and relearn-our traditions while ambling forward. As a result, we learn by
taking steps both forward and backward. We advance the field with new ideas and find
ings but must also step back and appreciate old ideas and old findings. This distinction
explains why, for example, Sigmund Freud's contribution to psychoanalysis has a
continuing relevance that his earlier work on the physiology of eels does not.
Randall Collins helps us take a step forward by combining Durkheimian and
Goffmanian themes in a new way-and then by showing us that this synthesis can
be used to produce interesting empirical analyses. Tom Morrione, Stanford Lyman,

and Arthur Vidich help us step back, so as to secure a better vantage point. They
want to teach us that Herbert Blumer was a more complicated thinker than we often
take him to be. In their books we are treated to primary texts that show Blumer in a
new light and, in the Lyman and Vidich collection, to a powerful historical commen
tary that situates Blumer's work in the tradition of post-Civil War reform. They
teach us something that I identify with Philip Rieff's work: that sociological theory,
culture, and tradition intersect, producing a distinctive "thought-world" with its
own constraining truths. Sociological theory is more than a guide to hypothesis con
struction: it is something we live in and that was built out of prior struggles. That
symbolic interactionism continues to speak to us today is not because of Blumer's
pithy definition but because it provides sociologists with an identity that was forged
at a pivotal time in American history. The moral, economic, and political climate
from which symbolic interactionism arose eerily resembles our own today, as Robert
Putnam convincingly argues in Bowling Alone (2000:367-401).
Herbert Blumer was born in St. Louis, Missouri, on March 7, 1900. His father,
not unlike either Goffman's or Garfinkel's father, ran a small business. Famously,
Blumer played professional football for the Chicago Cardinals from 1924 until
1933, when a knee injury ended his career. Morrione reminds us (2004:179-83) that
during these years Blumer rubbed shoulders (literally, I suppose) with the football
greats of his era: Red Grange, Bronko Nagurski, and Jim Thorpe. It's a wonderful
story. This should remind us of the cachet that Blumer must have brought to the dis
cipline. However, almost twenty years after his death, his fate is to be remembered
not as a celebrity but rather as a narrow contributor to sociology. Blumer is widely
thought of as "only" the inventor of symbolic interactionism and interpreter of
George Herbert Mead. For curious reasons, Blumer is rarely remembered as a
methodologist, despite all his work in this area, and Morrione and Lyman and
Vidich do not discuss this much in their volumes. Perhaps this is because Blumer's
advocacy of Cooley's notion of sympathetic introspection and his accompanying
criticisms of quantitative and/or variable analysis is out of step with our present
methodological detente. Symbolic interactionists themselves have become increas
ingly willing to employ a wide variety of methods, and so Blumer's message, per
haps best seen in his reading of Thomas and Znaniecki's Polish Peasant, now falls
on deaf ears.
Morrione's book strengthens our understanding of the Blumer who invented sym
bolic interactionism by combining an interpretation of Mead's social behaviorism
with the methodological and substantive interests of Chicago sociologists. This is the
Blumer we know. By contrast, Lyman and Vidich have a different goal: they expand
our understanding of Blumer by portraying him as something more than a symbolic
interactionist. They see him as the developer of a "public philosophy." As such,
Blumer was a participant in policy debates to "elaborate the human promise con
tained in the Declaration of Independence" in the aftermath of the Civil War
(Lyman and Vidich 2000:5). This is not the Blumer we know, at least not know well,
and we must thank Lyman and Vidich for allowing us to become acquainted with him.

We also owe a debt of gratitude to Morrione for his work on his volume. The
core chapters-about 100 pages-read seamlessly but were actually artfully con
structed by Morrione from more than one source. Blumer wrote the bulk of the
material in the mid-1960s, at about the time that he published his paper, "Sociological
Implications of the Thought of George Herbert Mead," in the American Journal of
Sociology (reprinted and better known as chapter 2 of Blumer's 1969 Symbolic
Interactionism). The structure of the two accounts of Mead is very similar. The better
known account concentrates on five "central matters": the self, the act, social inter
action, objects, and joint action (Blumer 1969:62). Morrione's new account has
Blumer focusing on human conduct, objects, the self, and both the individual and
social act. However, the surface similarity is misleading. In reality, Morrione's book
shows us Blumer explicating the ideas that are only skimmed in his short essay on
Mead. Morrione's account also makes us privy to the correspondence between
Blumer and David Miller in which these core ideas are further refined.
A good example of what Morrione brings to our attention is Blumer's interpreta
tion of Mead's view of the self. In the short paper on Mead in Symbolic Interactionism,
Blumer emphasizes one aspect of Mead's account, namely, that the self is reflexive
and as such can be an object to itself. His reason for doing so is a barely disguised
dislike for the work of Parsons, whose emphasis on the internalization of norms and
values made the self (in Blumer's view) a structure rather than a process. Rashly,
Blumer added (without naming Parsons), that such attempts "make no sense"
(1969:63). Blumer then proceeded to criticize Freud for having-again, in his
view-a different but equally flawed account of personality structure. This Blumer
seems unduly combative, throwing insults around without naming names. Morrione
shows us Blumer in a much better light, as a man who understood that Mead's re
flexive self was only one aspect of his overall analysis of self. While Mead certainly
emphasized our reflexive capabilities, he also recognized that our selves are formed
out of an interior dialog between the "I" and the "Me." This dialog reveals the cen
tral importance of the "generalized other" that was strikingly missing from
Blumer's short account. Blumer now has to tread carefully, because insofar as the
generalized other reflects community standards, our incorporation of them seems
very similar to Parsons's account of the internalization of norms.
In the first appendix to the book, Morrione reprints correspondence between
Blumer and Miller in which the content of the generalized other is debated in de
tail. This is a powerful display of theorizing and a valuable commentary on both
Mead and Blumer's own earlier assessment of Mead. Blumer begins (Morrione
2004:110) by revealing his concern that Mead's account of the generalized other can
accommodate only the "voice" of the community, whereas it needs to be able to ac
commodate the "voices" of the community, by which he meant that one group
within a society can have contradictory views on the same issue. Blumer's anxiety
here is related to his earlier concern with Mead's insistence in Mind, Self, and Society
that each person must have multiple selves. In the main text, Blumer chose simply
not to pursue Mead's argument concerning this (Morrione 2004:60). If Mead is right

and we do in fact have multiple selves that embody the multiple voices of the gener
alized other, Blumer wondered whether the content of the generalized other must
then include material that was "unrecognized and taken for granted by the group"
(Morrione 2004:123), and not just its immediately apparent rules and meanings. In
these fascinating exchanges, Blumer's thought comes alive, and we are able to ob
serve him in the act of theorizing, rather than as someone who simply pronounces.
The correspondence between Blumer and Miller teaches us that Blumer is not a
"faithful" student of Mead. Blumer is quite explicit about being uninterested in the
full range of Mead's philosophical concerns. He is also not content to be only a com
mentator on his work. Rather, Blumer correctly sees himself as extending the
framework he inherited from Mead. As a result, it is possible-and desirable-to
read Blumer as an independent theorist and thereby avoid discussion of his fidelity
to Mead. I believe Blumer signals this to us, although perhaps unintentionally, by
his reluctance to cite Mead. There is no possibility of using Blumer as a direct guide
to Mead because he does not tell us where in Mead to look. Blumer floats above
Mead's texts, reacting to the overall implications of his work. He does not offer a
close reading.
Blumer's strength and weakness was that he was a symbolic interactionist imperi
alist. This gave him clarity of vision but at a price. His well-known antipathy toward
Parsons and Freud meant that he could find nothing useful in their work (see, for
example, his bewildered reply to Jonathan Turner [1975]). He never displayed the
intimidating scholarship of his contemporaries, perhaps notably Parsons, Merton,
Goffman, Rieff, and Shils. On the contrary, he rarely cited anyone. In this, Blumer's
attitude is comparable to Garfinkel's desire to protect ethnomethodology from con
taminating (i.e., any) sources. Ironically, Blumer's genius was shown early on when
he recognized that an eclectic mix of pragmatism, philosophy, and homespun socio
logical research methods could be combined to produce a new approach in sociology
and a new identity for sociologists. His later weakness was his willingness to sup
press further cross-fertilization.
There is a second limitation in Blumer's style of argument---concerning his selec
tion of examples-which I am reluctant to mention. Nevertheless, I will do so be
cause I think it explains part of the resistance some sociologists exhibit to symbolic
interactionism. It strikes me that Blumer favored examples that work well "philo
sophically." That is to say, Blumer's examples often offer further clarification to
arguments that are already clear. Let me give an example, drawn almost at random.
Blumer tells us that the "world of action of human beings" is made up of different
objects: "Physical objects like a hammer or a wheel, social objects like a politician
or a spouse, abstract objects like compassion" (Morrione 2004:47). The beauty of
Blumer's examples is their clarity. As readers, we can all recognize his typology.
However, it also seems rather banal, even platitudinous.
I think that this is the key to Goffman's frustration with Blumer and with sym
bolic interactionism in general: its positions often seem so general that everyone
can agree with them, at which time no one really identifies with them. In Goffman's

case, this led him to disavow symbolic interactionism in favor of his own favorite
neologism, strategic interaction. Let me make this distinction: Blumer's examples
were useful in that they clarified his arguments, but they were not telling or coun
terintuitive. Blumer skated on thick ice because his examples seemed too safe. He
could not be seductive, as was Goffman, or charming, as is our best contemporary
symbolic interactionist, Gary Fine, or shocking, as was Michel Foucault, especially
in Discipline and Punish. In this book it is Foucault's examples-of Damiens's
botched execution, the plague, and the Panopticon, among others-that make the
book so memorable and compelling.
What about Blumer's empirical work as a public philosopher? Lyman and Vidich
endeavor to show that Blumer made four vital contributions: to the study of film
and propaganda, and to our understanding of race relations, labor relations, and
mass society. Lyman and Vidich are also explicit about something that remains implicit
in Blumer: the importance of morality for sociology. They state that the European leg
acy of Weber and the American legacy of Dewey and Mead teach us that we must
reestablish our "moral groundings" following the demise of Puritanism (2000:102).
Dewey and Mead sought to bring this about with better public education and child
hood socialization, in hopes that this would produce a sense of civic responsibility
that could prevent a free rider mentality. However-and critically-Lyman and
Vidich argue that Dewey and Mead had to fail because they could not ground a
"code of ethics" in anything other than appropriate socialization. Could Blumer do
better? In their judgment, Blumer did not solve the problem of grounding morality;
instead, he left us with even more reasons to be concerned about our moral well-being.
It is instructive that Morrione, Lyman, and Vidich all recognize that Blumer feared
that the contradictory voices from competing generalized others could provide a
blank check for a situational ethics that is thoroughly remissive. Without guidance
from faith, core values, or a compelling political agenda, public morality may be
reduced to a competition between self and group interests. However, Blumer
suggested that the contemporary world is not as bleak as this Weberian (or Rieffian)
description suggests. This is because, so Lyman and Vidich claim, Blumer was able to
identify something in the fabric of mass, secular society that allows for hope.
In taking a step forward, Randall Collins understands the importance of counter
intuitive, empirical analyses, and so he devotes half his book to a display of the em
pirical payoff of his own Goffman-inspired neologism, the interaction ritual chain.
Collins beautifully demonstrates the ability to appreciate past insights while extend
ing our theoretical understanding. In Merton's felicitous phrase, he is genuinely a
master of both the history and systematics of social theory. Like his former teacher,
Parsons, Collins wants to build a bridge between classical and contemporary socio
logical theory. Reminiscent of Parsons, Collins finds convergences in the work of
Durkheim, Weber, and Goffman. Collins is at odds with Parsons in that he has "pro
moted" Goffman over Freud (Parsons's choice), with the likely consequence that
introspective analyses will be played down, and observational, ethological, analyses
will be emphasized.

This synthesis produces something new: the centrality of "emotional energy"
(EE) in social exchanges. Collins's new concept is forged out of Durkheim's account
of collective effervescence and Goffman's analysis of the ritual order. Collins de
fines this state as one of "heightened intersubjectivity" (2004:35). When our rituals
work well we feel "entrained" by them, when they fail they fall flat: identities are
not "affirmed or changed," and we feel bored, tired, and eager to escape (2004:51-52).
In a series of wonderful empirical vignettes, Collins shows that even our clothing is
coded with EE: we put on our best clothes (whatever we take that phrase to mean)
to signal that people are worthy enough to see us looking our best. Collins then
notes that our present compulsory casualness is as hostile to a man arriving at a
party in jacket and tie as a previous era was to someone arriving in jeans (2004:22,
example modified slightly).
The EE that results from heightened intersubjectivity also sustains a moral order.
This is because group rituals sustain conceptions of the common good, both in
religious and secular environments (2004:39-40). So, in an interesting way, Collins
has an answer to the question of how morality is to be preserved that bothered
Mead and Blumer: not necessarily through faith or socialization but through institu
tionalized group rituals that possess high EE.
The second half of Collins's book demonstrates that his approach yields interest
ing findings. For example, in chapter 7, Collins reconsiders Weber's analysis of class,
status, and power in the light of his theory of interaction ritual chains. Collins points
out in a rather Blumerian way that survey data are misleading guides to these topics.
For example, although "professors" have high status, they lose status whenever
they become professors of anything. Also, any specification of rank or location also
produces status decline (2004:260). Similarly, Collins points out that money means
quite different things once it is contextualized: although few people have tens of
billions of dollars, the consumption patterns of the super wealthy are not very
different from those of the wealthiest 10 percent or more of the population. Indeed,
all the super wealthy can do with their billions is buy and sell rarified "financial
instruments" (2004:264). Collins also writes insightfully about the status-inversion
techniques used by celebrities and others who deliberately dress down in order to
acquire the "morally superior stance of the underdog" (2004:259). This leads Collins
to the Blumer-like conclusion that "macro-data" have to be grounded in micrositu
ations, where they are often played out in surprising ways.
Something similar can be said about power. Collins distinguishes between D-power
and E-power. The former is the power to make people give way, the latter is the
power to get things done. As Collins then argues, although both powers may coincide,
they may not, and this has to be understood as it occurs in microsituations. (Inciden
tally, there is one of a number of magnificent photographs here in his discussion-in
this case of servants serving tea to upper-class English cricketers).
I cannot do justice to Collins's achievement in this book. It really is a magnificent
display of the integration of existing theory, the development of new theory, and
powerful, counterintuitive empirical research. Collins allows us to take at least one

step forward. However, it is the fate of the social sciences to have to take backward
steps as well, and the books by Morrione and Lyman and Vidich teach us a lot that
is vital about our traditions. All three books therefore deserve to be read carefully.
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